From Davis Strait to Bering Strait: The Arrival of the Commercial Whaling Fleet in North America's Western Arctic by Bockstoce, John
VOL. 37, NO. 4 (DECEMBER 1984) P. 528-532 
ARCTIC 
From Davis  Strait. to Bering  Strait:  The  Arrival of the  Commercial 
Whaling Fleet  in North America’s  Western  Arctic 
JOHN  BOCKSTOCE* 
In  the  summer  of 1848 Captain  Thomas  Roys,  commanding  a 
whaling  vessel  from  Sag Harbor, Long  Island,  sailed  into  Ber- 
ing Strait and discovered the vast herds of bowhead whales 
(Balaenu mysticetus) that  lived  in  those  waters.  He  discovered 
the  most  important  new  whaling  ground  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury,  and  its  richness  supported  the  American  whaling  industry 
for  more  than 50 years.  It may seem  inappropriate to begin  an 
essay thus - in a symposium on Arctic history which con- 
cludes  with  the  eighteenth  century - but  in  fact  the  discovery 
of  the  Bering  Strait  whaling  ground  was  the  conclusion  of  a 
whaling movement that had begun several centuries earlier, 
and  that,  for  North  America,  commenced  with  the  arrival  of 
the first whaleships in Bering Strait’s eastern counterpart, 
Davis  Strait. 
One may  well  ask  why  the  connection  should  be  drawn  be- 
tween  these  two  whaling  grounds:  one  was  principally  a 
British  fishery  of  the  eighteenth  century;  the other, principally 
an American  fishery  of  the  nineteenth.  It  is true, nevertheless, 
that  the  European  whaling  industries  until  the  mid-nineteenth 
century  and  the  American  industry  until  its  demise n  the  early 
years of the twentieth century differed very little from one 
another in strategy, tactics, or technology. They remained 
essentially as they had originally developed, and, curiously 
enough,  they  did not  begin  to  change  substantially  until  the  lat- 
ter part of the nineteenth century, when Sven Foyn and his 
Norwegian  associates  thoroughly  altered  the  character  of  the 
industry by introducing an advanced  technology. 
This  paper,  then,  focuses  primarily  on  the  whaling  industry 
as a  whole  and not centrally  upon  the  arctic  regions - because 
the  impetus  for  the  arrival  of  the  whaling  fleets  at  the  gates  of 
the  American  Arctic  came  directly  from  the  economic  centers 
of  Europe  and  America,  and  only as the  result  of  a  concatena- 
tion  of  political  and  economic  events  were  the  fleets  drawn to 
the north. My discussion will not deal specifically with the 
history of either the Davis Strait or the Bering Strait whale 
fishery. It will, rather, analyze the series of events between 
their  two  discoveries  that  led  the  whaleships to Bering  Strait: 
for  although  whale  fisheries in  most  parts  of  the  world  have 
been capably studied, far less attention has been paid to the 
causes  which  led  the  fleets to abandon  one  fishery and  begin 
the  exploitation  of  another. 
Many  writers  have  been  drawn  to  the  romantic  and  adven- 
turesome  aspects  of  the  whaling  industry  at  the  expense  of  con- 
sidering  the  whaler’s  sole  objective:  making  money. The 
whalemen’s  consuming  purpose  was  to  catch as many whales 
as possible, as quickly as possible, and to bring the oil and 
baleen to market at the best price. For the most part they 
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operated  on  one  whaling  ground  until  its  yield had deteriorated 
to the  point  where  their  profits  became  unacceptably  low,  then 
they  moved  on to another.  There  were  few  radical  departures 
from  this  pattern  of  a  slow  outward  expansion as the  whaling 
grounds  closer  to  home  became  fished  out.  Whalemen  made 
very  few  daring  voyages  of  discovery as they  moved  outward 
in search  of new  whale  stocks. The farther  they had to go, the 
more costly the voyages; consequentlb if competitors were 
catching  whales  nearer  home,  it  made  little  sense to search  far- 
ther  away.  Only  the  existence  of  price  supports,  political  con- 
trols, or war contradicted these funda ental imperatives. 
Strangely  enough, it was  the  discov ry  of the  sperm  whale, 
or cachalot (Physeter cutodon), as a  lu  rative  quarry  that  drew 
the  whaling  fleets  to  the  bowhead wh I les  of  Bering  Strait.  In 
the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century’the  demand for lubricat- 
ing  and illuminating  oils by the growring societies  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic  was met for the most part by the  whaling  indus- 
try in the  waters  east  and  west  of  Greenland  and  off  the  coast 
of  Labrador.  Increasingly  during  this  period  the  whalemen  of 
Nantucket,  a  small  island  off  the  southeastern  coast  of  Massa- 
chusetts,  became  an  important  force in the  fishery. The 5000 
inhabitants - most of  them  Quakers - had few  natural 
resources to rely  on  and  therefore  turned  to  the s a, first  taking 
whales near home but soon expanding to the waters near 
Labrador, West Greenland, and as far south as the coast of 
Brazil.  They  sold  their  whale  products  both to the New 
England  colonies  and to England  itself,’  where  oil  and  baleen 
became  one  of  the  colonies’  most  important  sources  of credit, 
reaching to more  than 50% of  all  sterling  earnings in the  north- 
em colonies  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  American  War 
of  Independence. 
This  dramatic  growth  of  the  American  whaling  industry was
the  result  of  two  basic  innovations. The first  was  the  develop- 
ment  of  the  practice  of carrying4-y works  aboard  their  whale- 
ships. Try works - the  large  iron  cauldrons  built over fire  pits 
that  allowed  the men to  render  whale  blubber  into  oil  at  sea -
had  not  been  systematically  employed  before  1750.  The 
reasons  for  this  are clear. Where  whale  stocks  were  available 
near shore, the carcasses could simply be towed to a shore 
base  for  flensing and rendering.  For  fisheries  farther  north  the 
blubber  could be packed  into  casks  and  kept  without  its  turning 
rancid  until  the  ship  reached  a  shore  base or its  home port, a 
pr cedure  followed by the  British  fleet  in  their  northern  fish- 
ery. Before  about  1750  the  American  whalemen  did  not  need 
try works afloat because their voyages often lasted only a 
month or so and they could return with blubber from a few 
whales  before  it had spoiled. By 1750,  however,  with  nearby 
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whale  stocks depleted, the Nantucketers  were  forced to range 
farther north  and south. It seems  likely  that  it  was  because  of 
their expansion  southward  that they  began to employ  try  works 
aboard ship, an action  that  at once freed  the  whalemen of their 
fetters to shore, changed  their  vessels  into crude factory ships, 
and allowed them  to  become  truly  pelagic hunters. 
The other major  innovation - which, like the effect of ship- 
board try works, drew the Americans into distant waters - 
was the  development of a method  of  separating  the  thick  fluid 
found in a sperm  whale’s head into oil  and a waxy substance 
called spermaceti. The inventor of  this  process  was  possibly 
Jacob  Rodriguez Rivera, a Sephardic Jew  who arrived in  New- 
port, Rhode  Island in 1748. About  175 1 Rivera  began  to  pur- 
chase  “head matter” - this  mixture of  oil  and  spermaceti - 
to  make candles. He  used  the separated  spermaceti in the  can- 
dles  themselves, but the oil was a by-product. It  was  soon dis- 
covered, however, that this oil, when burned in a lamp, gave 
off a superior light  compared to that  from  the  oil  of a baleen 
whale.  Because  henceforth “sperm oil” would  have a higher 
value  than  “whale oil”, it brought  the  focus of the  American 
industry  onto  the  sperm  whale.  With their shipboard  try 
works,  the  Americans  quickly  spread  south in search of those 
whales, to the Azores, the  Brazil  Banks and, by 1775, to the 
Falkland  Islands. By that  year  the  Quakers of Nantucket  and 
New Bedford had a fleet of 300 vessels  and  were  essentially 
alone in the  sperm-whale fishery. 
But for the  Americans  these  achievements  were short-lived. 
The outbreak of the  War  of  Independence in 1775  marked the 
beginning of four decades of misfortune for the American 
whaling industry. The hostilities both cut the Americans off 
from their European markets and put the- Royal Navy and 
British privateers on  the  lookout for American vessels, causing 
the industry to wither. Nantucket went so far as to send a 
declaration  to  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  proclaiming 
neutrality, an  act  which  neither  gained  them favor among  the 
colonists, nor  spared their ships  from  the  British. 
With the  American  whaling  industry  nonexistent in the years 
following  1776,  the  British  industry was able to prosper, both 
by filling  the  vacuum  left by the Americans and  by continuing 
to receive bounties from the government on the tonnage of 
their vessels engaged in the northern whale fishery. And, in 
1783  with  the  end of hostilities, as the  Americans  struggled to 
regain their former markets, Britain  placed a duty  on  imported 
whale  oil  that  was  roughly  equal  to  its  market  value  and  thus 
effectively  embargoed  it. 
Because of the bounty and the tariff the British fleet ex- 
panded  rapidly  in the waters east of Greenland, largely  replac- 
ing the Dutch fleet, which at the time was on the decline. 
Those whaling grounds had, however, already been over- 
hunted,  and  the increase in British ships led to a decline in the 
average catch per vessel, reducing profits substantially. In 
fact, the  decline  was so sharp that by 1787  some  whaleships 
had trouble securing  the  minimum  catches to qualify for the 
bounty. By 1790 the size of the British northern fleet had 
shrunk dramatically, a contraction that was hastened by the 
war  with France  and  the  consequent loss of that export market. 
The  government  witnessed  the  decline in the size of the catch- 
529 
es, and, increasingly reluctant to grant large subsidies to a 
dying fishery, it reduced the bounty  on  vessels  operating  in  the 
north. These misfortunes, combined with the depredations  of 
press gangs in manning fighting ships, forced many vessels 
from  the northern fishery. Those  that  did  remain  were  forced 
to seek other whaling grounds, and the nearest  relatively  light- 
ly hunted area was the  Davis Strait region, west  of Greenland. 
Many  of the northern vessels  soon  began  to hunt there, a shift 
of focus that was to sustain the British northern fishery for 
another century. 
In the  meantime  the Nantucketers, who  were  reeling  from 
the effects of the British  tariff of  1783  and  who  lacked  another 
means  of  livelihood  on their small island, began seeking to cir- 
cumvent  the closure of the  British  market by transferring their 
base of operations within Britain’s tariff boundaries. One 
group was offered subsidies by the  government in Nova  Scotia 
and settled there at Dartmouth to begin activities from that 
port, while another group, under the leadership of William 
Rotch, Sr., sought  to  move  to  England. 
Rotch and his group were “Quakers with a vengeance,” 
Richard  Kugler  has written, “men  who  endorsed  the  pacifist 
principle of their faith  yet  lived by the  violence of the  whale 
fishery. The paradox was analyzed by (Herman) Melville, 
who  asked how Captain Peleg, ‘in the  contemplative  evening 
of his days, reconciled these things in reminiscence? Very 
probably  he had  long since  come to the  sage  and  sensible  con- 
clusion that a man’s religion is one thing and his practical 
world quite another. This world  pays dividends.”’ 
Rotch petitioned  the  British  government to allow  his group 
to enter England  with 20 ships  and to reimburse them for the 
expenses that they would incur both in moving and in re- 
establishing their shore support facilities. The government 
wished to sponsor the development of a vigorous whaling 
industry  and  was  willing to agree to Rotch’s  request but re- 
fused to allow  the  Americans  the  bounty  that  the  British  ships 
received. 
Rotch,  however, had hedged his bets and in the meantime 
had petitioned  the  French  government with a similar request, 
an  idea  that  caught  Louis  XVI’s  interest  because of  the 
possibility of competing  with  Britain in the  whaling industry. 
The  French  government  consequently offered the  Americans a 
bounty on their tonnage, and a dozen or more Nantucket 
families  moved to Dunkirk. 
In  1786  the  British  government, now  witnessing the rise of 
whaling  ports  in  Nova  Scotia  and France, began  to review  the 
status of its own industry. Its interest  was  the  continuation of 
its oil supplies,-and it  faced  two  basic  questions:  whether  on 
the one hand  it should continue to support the  declining  north- 
em fishery  and  whether on the other it should  begin to give 
strong support to the southem fishery, which appeared  to  have 
great potential in the central and  southern  Atlantic. Further- 
more, regarding the southern fishery, which  had  become 
almost  wholly the province of Nantucketers yho either hunted 
there on their own or were  employed  on  British ships, how 
could Britain gain more of their expertise in the face of 
challenges from Nova  Scotia  and  France? 
The Greenland  whaling  merchants were, naturally, loath  to 
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see their bounty  reduced.  The  government concluded, never- 
theless,  that  although  the  northern  fishery  provided  much  of 
Britain’s oil, the  bounty  was  expensive.  The  potential of the 
southern  fishery - and  especially  the  potential of the  stocks of 
sperm  whales  that  were  known to exist beyond Cape Horn  and 
the  Cape of  Good  Hope - appeared to be a better bet than  the 
northern waters, which  were closer to home  but  already  heav- 
ily hunted. 
In fact, several  merchants of  London  had  already  petitioned 
the  government for support of the southern fishery; principal 
among them were Samuel Enderby and his son. In 1775 the 
government began offering premiums to the British ships 
returning with the largest cargoes from  the  South  Atlantic,  and 
in 1776  the  Enderbys  sent 12 ships south.  In  1786  they  asked 
the  government  for a bounty on their tonnage to be  able to in- 
duce more Americans, who already made up most of their 
crews, to join the  British fishery; for although there was,  in- 
itially at least, less danger attendant on the southern fishery 
than  the northern, the  voyages  were  much longer, often  two 
years, and  the  cargoes  were  smaller  per  unit of time  than  in  the 
northern fishery. 
The British  government  recognized  the  political  nd 
economic advantages of sponsoring its own commercial ac- 
tivities in the  South Atlantic, Pacific  and  Indian Oceans and of- 
fered, rather than a bounty on tonnage as in the northern 
fishery, a premium on catches - an inducement which, it 
seems, would not have affected the whalers’ decisions on 
when to return  home,  as a bounty  might.  The  East  India Com- 
pany vigorously protested this government sponsorship of 
other  commercial activities within its area of monopoly, but 
the  government  prevailed  against  these  and other protests and 
in 1786  enacted a comprehensive law to encourage  the 
southern fishery. 
One year later one of the Enderby vessels, the Emilia of 
London,  under a Nantucket captain, became the first whale- 
ship  to  round  Cape  Horn  and to take a whale in the Pacific, 
capturing a sperm  whale  off  the  west  coast of South  America. 
Returning with a full cargo several years later, her success 
lured other ships there, and in 1791  the first American  whale- 
ship, the Beaver of Nantucket,  entered  the Pacific. In  1804 the 
Hannah and Eliza of  New Bedford  became  the  first  American 
whaleship  to enter the  Pacific via  the  Indian Ocean,  following 
a route that British whalers had sailed since the founding of 
Port Jackson in 1788. These whaling vessels, like the mer- 
chantmen  and sealers that  accompanied  them,  spilled  into  the 
Pacific on the wave of expanding geographical knowledge. 
They comprised  the  beginning of the  great  nineteenth-century 
commercial and  political  expansion  into  that  vast ocean. 
For the  Americans - who  would  ultimately  come  to domin- 
ate  the  whale fisheries in the  nineteenth  century - their star 
would  not  be ascendant  until  the  1820s. In the  years  following 
the War of Independence they were unable to compete in 
European  markets. “The English,” wrote  Thomas Jefferson, 
“had now begun to deluge  the  markets of France with their 
whale oils; and  they  were  enabled by the  great  premiums  given 
by their  government,  to  undersen  the  French fisherman, aided 
by feebler  premiums  and  the  American,  aided by  his  poverty 
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alone.” Furthermore, the Spaniards, who  bitterly  resented the 
arrival of British ships off their shores in  South  America, con- 
sidered the American vessels similarly unwelcome, and the 
“quasi-war” with France in the last years of the eighteenth 
century  allowed  French privateers to take their toll on Ameri- 
can  ships as well. These misfortunes  induced several Nantuck- 
eters to move  from their island, as  well  as  from  Dunkirk  and 
Nova Scotia, to Milford Haven in Wales to continue their 
operations in the southern fishery; in  fact  from  1788 to the  out- 
break of the  War  of  1812  two-thirds  of the British  vessels in 
that  fishery  were  commanded by Americans.  It was  only after 
the end  of  the  War  of  18  12  that  many of the  Americans re- 
turned  home to rejoin the industry that, for the first time in 40 
years, had  few  impediments  before  it. 
Just  when  the  American  whaling  industry  began  to  expand 
rapidly, the  British  industry - by then  America’s  only serious 
competitor - began to founder. In 1824 the British govern- 
ment  refused to renew  the  bounty  on  the  northern fishery, and 
whale-oil prices began  to  decline  steeply  under the assaults of 
both  rapeseed oil, which undercut  the use  of whale  oil in tex- 
tile manufacturing, and the developing coal-oil and coal-gas 
industry, which  put the price of  whale  oil  below  the  cost  of  its 
acquisition. In 1843 the tariff on American whale oil and 
sperm oil was cut severely, apparently in recognition of the 
fact  hat  he  British  industry  could  no  longer  supply  the 
nation’s  needs. 
Meanwhile  the  American  industry was riding  the  flood  tide 
of a growing  nation  that  allowed  the  industry  the  dual luxuries 
of cheap  manpower  and  raw  materials  while  at the same  time 
providing a ready  market for oils. A lag  in  the industrialization 
of the  nation  retarded  the effects of the  coal and petroleum  in- 
dustries on the whale41 market until after the end of the 
American  Civil  War in 1865. 
In 1815, with the end of the War of 1812, the American 
whaling  industry began a period of steady  growth  that would 
reach  its  zenith three decades later with the  discovery of the 
whaling grounds in Bering Strait, the Sea  of Okhotsk, and  the 
lagoons of  Baja California - a time  when  the  American  whal- 
ing  fleet  comprised  more  than 600 vessels. 
In  18  15 - the first time in four years  that  the  Royal Navy 
was  not  hunting for  American ships - the  American  whaling 
industry  surged ahead, acquiring  investment  capital  and 
developing new centers of commerce. Whaling  vessels  from 
New Bedford, New London, and many other ports in south- 
eastern Massachusetts,  Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Long 
Island began cruising on all the old whaling grounds of the 
North  and  South  Atlantic,  with the exception of the  waters east 
of Greenland. They were  part of a general  American  maritime 
commercial expansion, and they were accompanied or pre- 
ceded by merchantmen  and sealers as they  pushed  south  into 
the Atlantic, then east and west into the Pacific and Indian 
oceans. 
The  merchantmen  began to travel  routes  between  the  North- 
west Coast of America,  where they  bought furs, the  Hawaiian 
and other Pacific islands, where they bought sandalwood, 
mother of pearl, and Nche de mer, and  the  ports  of China, 
where they sold their cargoes, returning with tea, silk and 
I- 1 COMMERCIAL  WHALING  IN ORTH  AMERICA 
porcelain. The sealers fanned .out into  the  waters of -the Ant- 
arctic, to the SouthShetlands, South Orkneys, and to the Ant- 
arctic Peninsula itself, then  to the Crozets, -Desolation 
(Kerguelen);  and  Heard  islands. 
‘At the  same  time the.whaling fleet  exploded  into  the Pacific. 
In 1818,. four years after the  end  of  the war, there were  120 
American  whaling  vessels in the.Pacific, cruising for the most 
part on the familiar “on shore” grounds near the coasts -of 
Chile and  Peru  and  around  the  Galapagos Islands. In  that  year 
.the Globe of Nantucket sailed west and discovered the “off 
shore” grounds, an area rich in sperm whales, south of the 
Equator  between 105” and 125”  W.  In  1820 the Mar0 of Nan- 
tucket  and the Syren of London,  commanded  .by a Nantuck- 
eter, discovered the Japan  ground - equally  rich  waters 
stretching far  .east  of  that country, between  the  Bonin  Islands 
and Midway. At the  same  time  American  ships  began  cruising 
“on  the line,” the  5000-mile corridor that  spanned the Pacific 
at  the Equator. 
During the 1820s and 1830s the whaling. fleets cruised 
throughout  the  Pacific  from 50” S to 40” N,  chasing  the no- 
madic sperm whales throughout the year on one ,ground or 
another. They  reached first the  sperm  whales  near  the  Fiji  and 
Samoan  islands  and  the  coast  of Japan; later  .they  opened  the 
“coast of New Holland ground,” off Western Australia, as 
well as the  Sulu Sea, the  Celebes Sea, the Molucca  Passage, 
the “middle ground” between  Australia  and New Zealand,  the 
Vasquez  and “French Rock” grounds north of  New Zealand, 
and the  Tuamotu,  Solomon,  and Bonin islands,  among others. 
As time wore on .the length. of these voyages gradually in- 
creased from about 20 months to about 40 months as the 
numbers of sperm  whales  gradually  declined under the  pres- 
sure of the world’s whaling fleets -that, like the Americans, 
were  drawn to.these profitable waters. Because of the  length of 
their  voyages  the. ships would  touch  at  .ports  two or three times 
a year to take  on fresh supplies of  food  and water, to “recruit 
ship” (to sign on new men to make up for  deaths or deser- 
tions),-and to  communicate  with their.owners. In  181’9  the first 
whaleships reached Hawaii, and quickly Hilo, Lahaina, .and 
Honolulu - as well as. Tahiti, Nukahiva, and a number of 
otherplaces in South  America,  Asia, Australia, and New Zea- 
land - took on a new importance, not only for refitting be- 
tween cruises, but also as points  from which to send.home by 
cargo ship the accumulated  catch of oil and  .whalebone. This 
practice, which  helped  to  cushion  the  financial distress should 
the whaieship be lost, also served to lessen .the whaleship’s 
function  as a freighter. to carry the  ship’s oil. If a.ship were 
carrying the oil from  an entire voyage,  the  captain might  well 
have  had to modify  his  tactics as the cargo accumulated, balan- 
cing  the desire ‘to preserve a valuable cargo with.the need  to 
take -risks in search of whales.  The practice .of  transshipping 
.his cargo two or three times a year therefore .allowed the 
master to maintain a more aggressive search for whales in 
waters  that  were  often  poorly charted or known  to be 
dangerous. 
By 1840, however, the  sperm  whales in the Pacific were  on 
the decline. Paradoxically, the price of sperm  oil also began  to 
decline somewhat. .Faced with the assumption that they had 
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thoroughly  surveyed  the  waters  south of the  fortieth  parallel in 
the  North  Pacific, the fleets understandably  moved north. By 
1840  the entire N,orth’Pacific, with the  exception of the  Bering 
Sea, had been criss-crossed by traders and sealers, and it is 
likely that the whale resources of those waters .were well 
known. It is also likely that .the trading vessels, particularly 
those of the  Russian-American  Company - which regularly 
travelled  between  .the  Okhotsk Sea and the Gulf  of  Alaska  and 
Hawaii - would  have  passed  this  information directly or in- 
directly to the whalemen, who understood that there were 
stocks of right  whales (Eubalaena  galacialis) to be found at 
several places in the  North  Pacific. 
At the  same  time another factor entered  that  helped  to  draw 
ships north: in 1840  the  price of whalebone  began a rise  that 
more  than  doubled its value by 1844. Whalebone - baleen - 
had been a saleable.by-product of  baleen  whales  for  more  than 
four centuries. Because  it  could  be  cut intolong thin strips, or 
indeed  any  shape  that  the  baleen  plate  would  allow;  without 
sacrificing  its  strength or springy flexibility, and.also could be 
moulded by steam to hold a new shape, it was used in a 
number  of  items  where resilience was required, among  them 
umbrella spokes, buggy whips,  hat-brim stiffeners, brush 
bristles, and  corset stays. The length of the  baleen  plates  from 
st right  whale,  often  more  than  eight feet for  the  best  pieces, 
made it especially desirable .to the fashion market for  dress 
hoops  because  it was the lightest and  least fragile material used 
for. keeping skirts fully ballooned. And in 1840 the Parisian 
and  English couturiers began a 20-year  trend  calling for fully 
flaring skirts. Baleen’s increasing use in Victorian fashions 
and  its  limited  supplies  caused  the  price to rise, and  soon  the 
whaling  merchants  realized  that  the  value of a sperm  whale, 
which had hitherto been  more  actively  sought  because of its 
fine oil, was  decreasing  relative. to the right  whale  because of 
its  combined  yield  of  oil  and  whalebone. 
By 1843  knowledge of the decline in the stocks of Pacific 
sperm  whales  had  reached  the  pages  of  the Whalemen s Ship- 
ping List and Merchants ’ Transcript, a recent1.y-established 
weekly that, until  its demise in ,1914, would  .be the  American 
whaling industry’s .trade journal. 
We have given  some  attention  to  the  future  prospects of the 
demand  and  supply of s p r m  oil. Our  accounts  from  the fleet in 
the Pacific, by  recent  arrivals,  shows a great  falling off in the 
quantity of sperm oil taken  during  the  last  season,  as  compared 
with  previous  years.  From  the  unsuccessful  cruises of sperm oil 
ships;  from  the  fact.that  many  ships  have been, and the prob- 
ability.that  more.will be, withdrawn  from  thaf  business;  and  the 
additional fact that the diminished tariff of duties in England 
will  take effect on the  5th of July,  we  infer  that  holders  and  im- 
porters of sperm oil have seen their darkesthy, and  that  they 
may soon hope to realize remunerating.prices for that staple. 
We,  however,  do  not.think  that  the  prospects  are such.as to en- 
courage  reflecting  and  judicious  men  to join with the host of 
those  who  have  seemed  disposed, for some yearspast to cover 
the  Ocean  with  whale  .ships. 
Because the Atlantic and Indian oceans and most of the 
Pacific had already been thoroughly searched for stocks of 
whales, the whaling merchants, short of withdrawing their 
capital  from  the industry, were  left  with  only the,North Pacific 
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in which to hunt for right  whales.  It is probably  impossible. - 
and at any  rate it is unnecessary - to establish  the  identity of 
the  first  ships to hunt  along  the  Kurile  Islands,  on  Kamchatka, 
or in.  the  Gulf  of  Alaska,  but .it is  certain  that. €rom 1843 to 
1845 a large number of whaleships  from  several  nations  began 
to cruise on the rim of the North Pacific. The Whalemen’s 
Shipping Lbr, describing  the  activities  of the summer of 1844 
listed ships as cruising “on Kamchatka”; - the -use of the 
phrase  suggests  that  those  grounds had  become  commonplace, 
probably  a  year  before..And  we  know;  for  instance;that  Cap- 
tain  Mercator  Cooper  took  the ship Munhurrun briefly  into  the 
Okhotsk  Sea in 1845 and  that, she, as well as Thomas  Roys’ 
Josephine, and one .Danish, four  French,  .and  four  American 
ships  touched  at  Fetropavlovsk.  that  summer. 
There  is no doubt  that  Thomas,Roys’  voyage  to.Bering Strait 
was a .bold and innovative  departure  from  the  usual  cruising 
patterns, sailing as he did I 1ooO. miles beyond. the nearest 
whaleship, but his was also an intelligent .gamble. We have 
evidence  from as early as 1845 that  several  ships were taking 
bowhead  whales  in  the. waters,between Petropavolvsk  and  the 
Commander Islands. In that year Roys was forced to spend 
two  months  in  -Petropavlovsk,  recuperatmg.  from three broken 
ribs .inflicted, by the flukes ,of a fighting whale. There he 
.learned from  a  Russian  officer  that the same  ‘‘polar  whales” 
were  to  be  found in Bering  Strait;  On  retuming to Sag Harbor, 
Long  Island,  at  the  end  of  his  voyage,  he  consulted  Cook’s  and 
Wchey’s narratives  and  noted  their  reports  of  whales.  When 
h& returned b the  Pacific in 1848., aboard  the Superior, he  was 
prepared  for  the  risk  he  would  take. 
Roys  reaehed  Hawaii  with. a full ship in October 1848 and 
immediately  announced the news  of  his  success.  Whalers - 
unlike  .sealers,  who  kept the knowledge of newly-discovered 
-rookeries to themselves .- usually shared their discoveries, 
realizing  that  there  was  safety  in  numbers  in remote waters  of 
the  world. The Superior‘s voyage  set  off  a .flurry. of  excite- 
ment,  and the news  that  was  not spreadby word  of  mouth  was 
quickly  broadcast by the.  Honolulu  missionary  newspaper The 
Friend. By early 1849 most. of the  marine  journals  of  the  world 
had carried  the story. 
Roys.  not  only  made. the most  important  whaling.  discovery 
of ,the nineteenth century. but  also  brought  about  one  of  the 
most  impartant  events  in  the  history  of  the  Pacific.  Over  the 
next  seven  decades  the  richness of the  western  Arctic  whale 
stocks would lure the vessels of the United States, France, 
Germany,  Hawaii,  and Australia’through the  shallow  and- 
treacherous  waters  of  Bering  Strait.  More  than 2700 whaling. 
cruises would  be  carried out. there at .a cost  of  more  than 150 
lost  whaleships and the  near-extinction  of  the  bowhead  whale. 
The  vast  American ‘presence. there would  add  impetus to the 
sale and purchase of Alaska. The support- facilities that the 
whaling  industry  generated  in  Hawaii,  for  refitting  before  and 
after  their  northern  cruises,  would  contribute to the  American 
presence  .in  those,  islands  that  ultimately  led to their  annexa- 
tion.  The  natives  on  both  sides.  of  Bering  Strait, as well as in 
northern  Alaska  and.western arctic Canada, would  be  supplied 
with  western  manufactured  goods.  and.their  lifeways  would  be 
changed - for  better and worse. As Wodd War I approached, 
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the  Arctic  .whaling  industry  would  spawn, in  its  death throes the 
maritime fur trade .in .the western Arctic, an activity which 
would employ most of the Eskimos, and a few remaining 
whalemen,  until  the  beginning  of  the  Second  World.War.  And 
finally, one of’ the whalemen would ultimately cause the 
western  Arctic’s  second  oil  rush - by, reporting  the  oil  seeps 
in the  Sagavanirktok  River  delta  that  led  to the,Prudhoe Bay oil 
strike. 
